



Remuneration Report 2024

Mercedes-Benz Group

Dear Shareholders,

On behalf of the Board of Management and Supervisory Board, and in my first year as Supervisory Board Chairman, I am pleased to present the 2024 Mercedes-Benz Group AG Remuneration Report.

I would like to use this foreword to highlight the key aspects of the 2024 remuneration system as well as to provide a brief outlook on upcoming changes.

The Supervisory Board places great importance on ensuring that the compensation of the Board of Management members is directly tied to their performance, assessed through financial and strategic objectives. 2024 was a year where the Group made considerable strides in reaching its strategic aims, despite persistent global economic challenges.

Remuneration 2024

The annual bonus target achievement for the Board of Management for 2024 is 140%, which is lower than that of 2023. This reflects the challenging year that we, along with many others in the automotive sector, experienced and demonstrates that the remuneration system functions as intended. The 140% target is nonetheless a meaningful achievement, highlighting the Board of Management's success in navigating a tough climate.

This marks the second full year of the remuneration system adjusted in 2023, which was approved by the Annual General Meeting on May 3, 2023. It is also the

second year that ESG targets play an increased role within the remuneration system, incorporated into both the Short Term Incentive and the Long Term Incentive components of the system. A further key change in 2023 was the removal of the so-called deferral, whereby half of the annual bonus payout was delayed by a year. 2024 is the final year with an overlap of the old and current system, as the bonus deferral from 2022 was paid out in March 2024.

Reflecting the challenging year, the Board of Management last received a salary increase in mid-2023. The Supervisory Board decided it was not appropriate to increase the Board of Management's salaries in 2024.

Outlook: New System from 2026 Onwards

It is planned to propose a new system at the Annual General Meeting on May 7, 2025. Although a review of the system is not yet due, the Supervisory Board decided to introduce changes to incorporate investor feedback. The short-term-incentive in the new system will be further simplified, and will include a weighted methodology instead of only an additive one, ensuring the 200% cap is never exceeded. Furthermore, it will consist of only two components (financial and non-financial), removing transformation targets and increasing focus on quantitative targets. Additionally, occupational safety will be introduced as a non-financial target for the first time, emphasising its importance both as an internal goal and within the remuneration system.

Subject to Annual General Meeting approval, I am optimistic that the proposed system will reduce complexity, increase measurability of goals, and maintain a strong emphasis on ESG targets.

On behalf of the Supervisory Board, I would like to extend my thanks to the teams for their work over the past year, which has enabled a fair and appropriate remuneration system. I also extend my gratitude to our shareholders for their continued commitment in this important matter.

Yours sincerely,



Dr Martin Bruder Müller

Chairman of the
Supervisory Board

According to the requirements of Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, AktG), the Remuneration Report explains the application of the remuneration system for the members of the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board of Mercedes-Benz Group AG. Furthermore, it describes the amount and structure of the individual remuneration awarded and due for the current and former members of the Board of Management and Supervisory Board in financial year 2024. The remuneration system as well as the remuneration report comply with the recommendations and suggestions of the German Corporate Governance Code (Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex, DCGK), as amended on April 28, 2022.

The remuneration system for members of the Board of Management is from the point of view of the Supervisory Board aligned with the business strategy as well as the sustainable and long-term growth of the company and was approved by the Annual Shareholders' Meeting according to Section 120a Subsection 1 AktG on May 3, 2023 with an approval rate of 91.00%. It can be accessed on the company's website at group.mercedes-benz.com/company/corporate-governance/board-of-management/remuneration. Remuneration of the Supervisory Board as well as the corresponding amendment to the Articles of Incorporation were approved at the Annual Shareholders' Meeting according to Section 113 Subsection 3 AktG on May 3, 2023, with an approval

rate of 98.16%. The remuneration system of the Supervisory Board can be accessed on the company's website at group.mercedes-benz.com/company/corporate-governance/supervisory-board/remuneration. The Remuneration Report 2023 was presented to the Annual Shareholders' Meeting for approval pursuant to Section 120a Subsection 4 AktG on May 8, 2024, and was approved with an approval rate of 87.28%. The high approval result encourages the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board in their approach to transparent reporting.

The Remuneration Report 2024 was audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers GmbH Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft, exceeding the requirements of Section 162 Subsection 3 AktG according to both formal and substantial criteria. The auditor's opinion is enclosed with the Remuneration Report 2024.

Principles of Board of Management remuneration¹

The automotive industry is in the midst of the greatest transformation in its history. Sustainability and especially environmental and climate protection are among the most pressing issues of the time. As the inventor of the automobile, Mercedes-Benz Group AG also wants to set standards for sustainable mobility.

It has set itself the goal of making the accelerated

transformation into a fully electric and software-driven future profitable. Mercedes-Benz Cars aims for a leading position in electromobility and digital experiences. With ambitious product development goals and the market launch of new, locally emission-free, and software-driven technologies, the business unit is creating the necessary conditions to become fully electric.

From the company's point of view, the Board of Management remuneration system makes a significant contribution to promoting the business strategy and the long-term and sustainable development of the company. It incentivizes the achievement of our strategic goals and provides effective incentives for the long-term, value-creating development of the company in the interests of all stakeholders: customers, investors, employees, business partners and society as a whole. Given the central importance of the topics of sustainability, integrity and diversity, which form the basis of the Mercedes-Benz Group's actions, in addition to financial performance criteria, ESG goals are also taken into account to a considerable extent within the variable remuneration.

In the opinion of the Supervisory Board, ensuring the appropriateness of the remuneration with regard to the performance of the Executive Board members is achieved, on the one hand, through a high proportion of variable remuneration components and, on the other hand, through ambitiously set targets in the

¹ This chapter contains disclosure obligations related to the European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) concerning the sustainability-related performance criteria of the Board of Management remuneration.

performance criteria for the variable remuneration components. In addition, standard market practice is used, taking into account the size, complexity and economic situation of the company.

Remuneration guidelines

- The remuneration system as a whole contributes significantly to promoting the business strategy.
- The remuneration system and the performance criteria for its variable components incentivise the Group's long-term and sustainable development.
- The remuneration system is an important factor in linking the interests of the shareholders, customers, employees and other stakeholders.
- The performance of the Board of Management members is appropriately taken into account in the variable remuneration components by adequately and ambitiously set performance targets (pay for performance).

Review and determination of Board of Management remuneration

For each upcoming financial year, the Presidential Committee prepares the review of the remuneration system and the individual remuneration amount set by the Supervisory Board and, where necessary, prepares suggestions for changes. In the process, the Presidential Committee and the Supervisory Board make use of the advice of external remuneration experts if required. This was also done in the reporting period.

Based on the approved remuneration system and the recommendations of the Presidential Committee, the Supervisory Board determines the amount of the target total remuneration of the individual members of the

Board of Management for each upcoming financial year. It shall be set in an adequate proportion to the responsibilities and performance of each member of the Board of Management and to the situation of the company. In addition, the Supervisory Board ensures that the target total remuneration is in line with the market. For this purpose, it uses a horizontal as well as a vertical comparison. For the horizontal – external – comparison of the target total remuneration, with regard to the market position of the company (in particular sector, size and country), the DAX and a group of international competitors consisting of listed automotive manufacturers are used. The composition of the international comparison group for the horizontal comparison corresponds to the group of competitors considered for the performance criteria for the long-term variable remuneration component (Performance Phantom Share Plan).

In addition to the horizontal comparison, the Supervisory Board takes into account the development of the Board of Management remuneration in a vertical – internal – comparison with the remuneration of the senior executives and the total workforce (tariff and non-tariff employees, including senior executives) of the Group in Germany. This is done by comparing the ratio of the remuneration of the Board of Management with the remuneration of the defined groups of employees, including its development. In addition, a market comparison is carried out of the ratio of the remuneration of the Board of Management to that of the total workforce compared with the DAX companies. For this purpose, the Supervisory Board has defined

the group of senior executives as follows: It consists of the two management levels below the Board of Management at Mercedes-Benz Group AG within the Group in Germany. In the event of significant shifts in the horizontal comparison or significant changes of the ratio between the remuneration of the Board of Management and the vertical comparison groups, the Supervisory Board examines the causes and, in the absence of objective reasons, adjusts the remuneration of the Board of Management if necessary.

Overview of the components of the remuneration system

The remuneration system, which was approved by the Annual General Meeting on May 3, 2023, applies to all components of remuneration. Only the PPSP tranches allocated in the past are still measured exclusively on the basis of financial performance criteria based on the remuneration system valid in 2020. Furthermore, the deferred medium-term portion of the 2022 annual bonus ('Deferral 2022') is subject to the the 2020 remuneration system. The remuneration system basically consists of fixed non-performance-related and variable performance-related remuneration components, the sum of which determines the total remuneration of a member of the Management Board.

The fixed non-performance-related remuneration consists of the base salary, the fringe benefits (non-cash benefits, mainly expenses assumed by the company for security services and the provision of company cars), which may vary each year based on individual and certain events, and the annual amounts

for pension commitments of each member of the Board of Management.

The variable performance-related remuneration is divided into a short-term variable remuneration (annual bonus) and a long-term variable remuneration (PPSP). The annual bonus is paid out after the end of the financial year. Previously (up until Financial Year 2022), 50% of the annual bonus was paid out after the end of the financial year and 50% after the end of a further year (deferral), linked to relative share price performance. This was discontinued at the end of the 2022 financial year. The last payout from the deferral therefore took place in 2024. The amount to be paid out for the long-term variable remuneration component (PPSP) is determined and paid out after the end of the four-year plan period.

| | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|--|--|
| Fixed remuneration | Base salary | - A fixed contractually agreed remuneration that is paid in twelve monthly installments | |
| | Fringe benefits | - Mainly expenses for security precautions and the provision of company cars | |
| | Pension commitment/ pension compensation | - An annual contribution in the amount of 15 % of the sum of the base salary and the total annual bonus as determined at the end of the reporting period | |
| Variable remuneration | Short-term variable remuneration (annual bonus) | Type | - Annual bonus |
| | | Cap | - 200% of base salary |
| | | Performance criteria | - Financial performance criteria |
| | | | - 50% EBIT target/actual comparison - 50% free cash flow (FCF) of the industrial business target/actual comparison - Range of possible target achievement: 0% - 200% |
| | Long-term variable remuneration | Performance criteria | - Non-financial performance criteria |
| | | | - Range of possible target achievement: -10% - +10% |
| | | Payout | - Transformation targets - Range of possible target achievement: -25% - +25% |
| Long-term variable remuneration | Type | - After the financial year | |
| | Cap | - 250% of the grant value | |
| | Performance criteria | - 40% relative return on sales - 40% relative share performance - 20% ESG criteria | |
| | | Payout | - After three-year performance period and one-year holding period |
| Malus / Clawback | - Partial or full reduction or reclaim of the variable remuneration is possible | | |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines (SOG) | - The number of the shares to be held is set between 20,000 and 75,000 shares - Up to 25 % of the gross remuneration of each PPSP is generally to be used to acquire ordinary shares | | |

Structure and term of the target remuneration

| Target remuneration | in % | €k | Term | | | |
|--|------------------------------|---|--|--------|--------|--|
| | approx. 40% | CBM ¹ : 2,717 OMB ² : 1,358 | Performance Phantom Share Plan 3-year performance period | | | Performance Phantom Share Plan 1-year holding period |
| approx. 30% | CBM: 1,876 OMB: 938 - 959 | Annual bonus Pay out after the financial year | | | | |
| approx. 30% | CBM: 1,876 OMB: 938 - 959 | Base salary | | | | |
| Payout, performance or commitment date | | Fringe benefits | | | | |
| | | Pension commitment | | | | |
| | | | Year 1 | Year 2 | Year 3 | Year 4 |

1 CBM: Chair of the Board of Management
2 OMB: Ordinary Member of the Board of Management


Structure of the target total remuneration of the members of the Board of Management

The base salary and the short-term variable remuneration (annual bonus) each contribute to approximately 30% of the target remuneration (excluding the pension commitments and fringe benefits), while the long-term variable remuneration (PPSP) makes up approximately 40% of the target remuneration. Thus, the long-term variable component exceeds the short-term variable component so that the focus is on the long-term and sustainable development of the company without neglecting the operational annual targets. Both the annual bonus and the long-term variable remuneration from PPSP with its link to additional, in the view of the Supervisory Board, ambitious comparative parameters and to the share price reflect the recommendations of the DCGK, which stipulates the variable

remuneration that results from the achievement of long-term targets should exceed that from short-term targets.

Remuneration structure

Target remuneration consists of non-performance-related and performance-related components:



The pension contribution to the respective pension commitment of the members of the Board of Management is currently calculated as 15% of the sum of the base salary and the total annual bonus as determined at the end of the reporting period.

Target total remuneration of the members of the Board of Management for the financial year 2024

The Supervisory Board has set the following target total remuneration for members of the Board of Management in the financial year 2024, calculated from

- The 2024 base salary;
- The taxable non-cash benefits and other fringe benefits in the financial year 2024;
- The short-term annual bonus for 2024 payable in the financial year 2025 at the value for target achievement of 100%;
- The grant value (this corresponds to the target value) of the long-term variable remuneration (PPSP tranche 2024-2027; dividend equivalents for the PPSP-tranches are not taken into account) at the time when granted in the financial year 2024 (payable in financial year 2028); and
- the pension expense in the financial year 2024 (service costs for the financial year 2024).

Target remuneration

| | Ola Källenius Chairman of the Board of Management | | Dr. Jörg Burzer ¹ Production, Quality & Supply Chain Management | | Renata Jungo Brüngger Integrity, Governance & Sustainability | |
|--|---|--------------|--|--------------|--|--------------|
| | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 |
| | in €k | in €k | in €k | in €k | in €k | in €k |
| Base salary | 1,876 | 1,770 | 938 | 885 | 938 | 885 |
| Taxable non-cash benefits and fringe benefits ² | 505 | 85 | 611 | 406 | 70 | 82 |
| Sum fixed remuneration | 2,381 | 1,855 | 1,549 | 1,291 | 1,008 | 967 |
| Short-term variable remuneration | | | | | | |
| One-year variable remuneration 2024 (100% of annual bonus 2024) | 1,876 | - | 938 | - | 938 | - |
| One-year variable remuneration 2023 (100% of annual bonus 2023) | - | 1,770 | - | 885 | - | 885 |
| Long-term variable remuneration | | | | | | |
| PPSP tranche 2024 | 2,717 | - | 1,358 | - | 1,358 | - |
| PPSP tranche 2023 | - | 2,717 | - | 1,358 | - | 1,358 |
| Sum variable remuneration | 4,593 | 4,487 | 2,296 | 2,243 | 2,296 | 2,243 |
| Pension expense (service costs) | 570 | 507 | 286 | 285 | 281 | 250 |
| Target total remuneration | 7,544 | 6,849 | 4,131 | 3,819 | 3,585 | 3,460 |

1 Dr. Jörg Burzer was appointed to the Board of Management effective December 1, 2021. Fringe benefits accordingly include in 2023 and 2024 one-time expenses. In particular, this applies to safety-related modifications to Dr Burzer's residential property.

2 Taxable non-cash benefits and fringe benefits: actuals are shown.

Target remuneration

| | Sabine Kohleisen ¹ | | Markus Schäfer | | Britta Seeger | |
|--|--------------------------------------|--------------|--|--------------|-------------------|--------------|
| | Human Relations & Labour Director | | Chief Technology Officer, Development & Procurement | | Marketing & Sales | |
| | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 |
| | in €k | in €k | in €k | in €k | in €k | in €k |
| Base salary | 938 | 885 | 938 | 885 | 938 | 885 |
| Taxable non-cash benefits and fringe benefits ² | 304 | 590 | 110 | 177 | 111 | 110 |
| Sum fixed remuneration | 1,242 | 1,475 | 1,048 | 1,062 | 1,049 | 995 |
| Short-term variable remuneration | | | | | | |
| One-year variable remuneration 2024 (100% of the Annual bonus 2024) | 938 | - | 938 | - | 938 | - |
| One-year variable remuneration 2023 (100% Annual bonus 2023) | - | 885 | - | 885 | - | 885 |
| Long-term variable remuneration | | | | | | |
| PPSP tranche 2024 | 1,358 | - | 1,358 | - | 1,358 | - |
| PPSP tranche 2023 | - | 1,358 | - | 1,358 | - | 1,358 |
| Sum variable remuneration | 2,296 | 2,243 | 2,296 | 2,243 | 2,296 | 2,243 |
| Pension expense (service costs) | 281 | 253 | 282 | 250 | 286 | 253 |
| Target total remuneration | 3,819 | 3,971 | 3,626 | 3,555 | 3,631 | 3,491 |

1 Sabine Kohleisen was appointed to the Board of Management effective December 1, 2021. Fringe benefits accordingly include in 2023 and 2024 one-time expenses. In particular, this applies to safety-related modifications to Sabine Kohleisen's residential property.

2 Taxable non-cash benefits and fringe benefits: actuals are shown.

Target remuneration

| | Hubertus Troska ¹ | | Harald Wilhelm | |
|--|------------------------------|--------------|---|--------------|
| | Greater China | | Finance & Controlling / Mercedes-Benz Mobility | |
| | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 |
| | in €k | in €k | in €k | in €k |
| Base salary | 938 | 885 | 959 | 904 |
| Taxable non-cash benefits and fringe benefits ² | 532 | 687 | 47 | 63 |
| Sum fixed remuneration | 1,470 | 1,572 | 1,006 | 967 |
| Short-term variable remuneration | | | | |
| One-year variable remuneration 2024 (100% of the Annual bonus 2024) | 938 | - | 959 | - |
| One-year variable remuneration 2023 (100% Annual bonus 2023) | - | 885 | - | 904 |
| Long-term variable remuneration | | | | |
| PPSP tranche 2024 | 1,358 | - | 1,358 | - |
| PPSP tranche 2023 | - | 1,358 | - | 1,358 |
| Sum variable remuneration | 2,296 | 2,243 | 2,317 | 2,262 |
| Pension expense (service costs) | 281 | 250 | 292 | 263 |
| Target total remuneration | 4,047 | 4,065 | 3,615 | 3,492 |

1 Hubertus Troska: In connection with Hubertus Troska's activities abroad, taxable non-cash benefits have accrued in arrears for previous years. In addition, costs were incurred with regard to Hubertus Troska's deployment location.

2 Taxable non-cash benefits and fringe benefits: actuals are shown.

Maximum amounts of remuneration and maximum total remuneration

Pursuant to Section 87a Subsection 1 Sentence 2 No. 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), the remuneration system for the Board of Management provides for a maximum remuneration (cap) for members of the Board of Management. The maximum remuneration achievable for a financial year, comprising base salary, variable remuneration components, pension expense and fringe benefits, is capped at €12,000,000 gross for the Chair of the Board of Management and at €7,200,000 gross for each ordinary member of the Board of Management (“maximum total remuneration”).


In addition to the maximum total remuneration, the remuneration of the members of the Board of Management also has already had caps on each of the variable remuneration components and a cap on the amount of the cash payments (“cash inflow cap”) for many years. For the Chair of the Board of Management, this maximum amount is set at 1.7 times, for the other members of the Board of Management at 1.9 times, the sum of the base salary, the target annual bonus and the PPSP value when granted.

The possible cap on the amount exceeding the maximum total remuneration and/or the maximum limit of the cash payments for financial year 2024 is

determined with the payment of the PPSP issued in the relevant financial year, i.e., for the financial year 2024, with payment of the PPSP 2024 in the financial year 2028.

In the financial year 2024, the Supervisory Board ensured that the maximum amount of the cash payments, and statutory maximum total remuneration, were complied with. A final statement on compliance with the maximum total remuneration and the maximum amount of the cash payments for the financial year 2024 can only be made once the targets have been achieved and the PPSP issued in the financial year 2024 has been determined for the financial year 2028.

Calculation of the maximum amount of remuneration (cap of cash payments) and maximum total remuneration



Maximum total remuneration 2020

| | Ola Källenius | Martin Daum ¹ | Renata Jungo Brüngger | Wilfried Porth | Markus Schäfer | Britta Seeger | Hubertus Troska | Harald Wilhelm |
|---|------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| | in €k | in €k | in €k | in €k | in €k | in €k | in €k | in €k |
| Base salary | 1,415 | 707 | 707 | 707 | 707 | 707 | 707 | 723 |
| Taxable non-cash benefits and fringe benefits | 72 | 115 | 96 | 88 | 96 | 86 | 748 | 77 |
| Pension expense (service costs) | 520 | 250 | 252 | 0 | 254 | 256 | 250 | 291 |
| Sum fixed remuneration | 2,007 | 1,072 | 1,055 | 795 | 1,057 | 1,049 | 1,705 | 1,091 |
| Short-term variable remuneration | | | | | | | | |
| One-year variable remuneration 2020 (50 % of the annual bonus 2020) | 1,232 | 616 | 616 | 616 | 616 | 616 | 616 | 629 |
| Deferral 2020 (50 % of the annual bonus 2020) | 1,379 | 690 | 690 | 690 | 690 | 690 | 690 | 704 |
| Long-term variable remuneration | | | | | | | | |
| PPSP 2020 | 4,497 | - | 2,248 | 2,350 | 2,248 | 2,248 | 2,248 | 2,248 |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2020 in 2023 | 605 | - | 303 | 316 | 303 | 303 | 303 | 303 |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2020 in 2022 | 291 | - | 145 | 152 | 145 | 145 | 145 | 145 |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2020 in 2021 | 64 | 32 | 32 | 34 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2020 in 2020 | 43 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 |
| Sum variable remuneration | 8,111 | 1,359 | 4,055 | 4,180 | 4,055 | 4,055 | 4,055 | 4,082 |
| Total remuneration 2020 | 10,118 | 2,431 | 5,110 | 4,975 | 5,112 | 5,104 | 5,760 | 5,173 |
| Maximum total remuneration for 2020 | 12,000 | 7,200 | 7,200 | 7,200 | 7,200 | 7,200 | 7,200 | 7,200 |

¹ The ongoing PPSP plans and the associated dividend equivalents were transferred to Daimler Truck Holding AG in 2021 with the spin-off.

Remuneration components of the Board of Management in financial year 2024 in detail¹

The individual components of the Board of Management's remuneration in detail are as follows:

Fixed remuneration components Base salary

The base salary is fixed remuneration relating to the entire year, oriented on the area of responsibility and experience of each Board of Management member and paid out in twelve monthly instalments.

Fringe benefits

Fringe benefits are an additional component of the fixed remuneration. These mainly comprise expenses for security precautions and the provision of company cars. In addition, special location-based benefits can be provided for Board of Management members who work abroad. In connection with Hubertus Troska's activities abroad, for example, subsequent, taxable non-cash benefits for previous years were accrued.

In the reporting period, the members of the Board of Management were also included in a financial loss and liability insurance policy in an adequate amount for executive bodies and certain executives (Directors & Officers insurance) taken out by the company in the interest of the company with a corresponding deducti-

ble in accordance with Section 93 Subsection 2 AktG. The insurance premiums were paid by the company.

Retirement benefits

In the financial year 2012, the company introduced a new company retirement benefit plan for new entrants and new appointments both for employees paid in the area of collective bargaining agreements as well as for executives: the Mercedes-Benz Pensions Plan (MBPP). This retirement benefit system features the payment of annual contributions by the company and is aligned with the capital market. The company merely makes a commitment to guarantee the total of contributions paid, which are invested in the capital market according to a pension-oriented investment concept.

The Supervisory Board has approved the application of this retirement benefit plan for all members of the Board of Management newly appointed since 2012, therefore all active members have the MBPP. The amount of the annual contributions results from a fixed percentage of the base salary and the total annual bonus for the respective financial year calculated as of the end of the reporting period. This percentage in the financial year 2024 is 15%. Contributions to the retirement benefit plan are granted until the age of 62. The benefit from the MBPP is payable to living Board of Management members at the earliest at the age of 62, irrespective of an earlier termination of the service relationship. If a member of the Board of Management terminates the service relationship due to the member

being unfit for service, the benefit is paid as a limited capacity benefit, even before the age of 62.

Three options exist for the payout of the MBPP retirement benefit system:

- as a one-time payment;
- in twelve annual instalments, whereby interest accrues on each partial amount as of commencement of the insured event (at least 1 % p.a., including any profit shares according to the insurance tariff defined in the pension commitment);
- or as a pension with annual increases (at least 1 % p.a., including any profit shares according to the insurance tariff defined in the pension commitment)

The service agreements of Board of Management members contain provisions, according to which in the event of the passing of the Board of Management member before age-related retirement, the spouse/registered civil partner/named life partner or legally dependent children pursuant to Section 32 of the Income Tax Act (EStG) are entitled to receive the accumulated MBPP credit amount plus a surcharge for the remaining period until the calculated age of the Board of Management member would have reached 62.

If a Board of Management member passes away after retiring for reasons of age, the heirs are entitled to re-

¹ This chapter contains disclosure obligations related to the ESRS concerning the sustainability-related performance criteria of executive compensation.

ceive the benefits in the case of the payout option in twelve annual instalments. For the pension payout option with survivor benefits, the spouse/named life partner/registered civil partner are entitled to receive 60% of the actual pension amount.

The "Pension Capital" (PC) system, where a capital component was credited annually, was used from the beginning of 2006 until the end of 2011. The Board of Management members active in 2024 still have – except for Harald Wilhelm – legacy commitments from this model that are payable. PC is paid out, regardless of an early termination of service, at the earliest at the age of 60 (amount paid is the total of the capital components including interest). If the service relationship ends due to the member being unfit for service, the pension is paid out as a limited capacity benefit up to the age of 60.

Payments under the PC retirement benefit system can also be made in three ways:

- as a one-time payment;
- in twelve annual instalments, whereby interest accrues on each partial amount from the time payments commence until the payout is complete (6% or 5% p.a.);
- as a pension with annual increases (3.5% p.a.).

The arrangements made for leaving the company prior to the appointment to the Board of Management – except for Harald Wilhelm – provide for a bridging

allowance until the statutory retirement age is reached, which is based on the age at the time of leaving the company. The Supervisory Board reserves the right to revise this regulation under certain circumstances.

Departing Board of Management members are furthermore provided with a company car, in some cases for a defined period.

Service costs for pension obligations to Board of Management members in office during the reporting period in accordance with IAS 19 amounted to €2.6 million in the financial year 2024 (2023: €2.3 million). The present value of the total defined benefit obligation according to IAS 19 amounted to €25.7 million as at December 31, 2024 (2023: €21.4 million). Taking age and period of service into account, the following tables shows the resulting service costs and present values:

Service costs and present value for members of the Board of Management

| in €k | Year | Service costs | Present value of obligations |
|-----------------------|-------------|---------------|------------------------------|
| | 2024 | 570 | 7,340 |
| Ola Källenius | 2023 | 507 | 6,026 |
| | 2024 | 286 | 1,143 |
| Dr Jörg Burzer | 2023 | 285 | 693 |
| | 2024 | 281 | 2,848 |
| Renata Jungo Brüngger | 2023 | 250 | 2,693 |
| | 2024 | 281 | 1,011 |
| Sabine Kohleisen | 2023 | 253 | 556 |
| | 2024 | 282 | 3,898 |
| Markus Schäfer | 2023 | 250 | 3,311 |
| | 2024 | 286 | 3,739 |
| Britta Seeger | 2023 | 253 | 3,097 |
| | 2024 | 281 | 3,711 |
| Hubertus Troska | 2023 | 250 | 3,606 |
| | 2024 | 292 | 1,983 |
| Harald Wilhelm | 2023 | 263 | 1,424 |

Note: Some of the obligations relate to entitlements that were earned before the Board member joined the Board of Management.

Variable remuneration components

The variable remuneration is intended to provide the right incentives for the Board of Management to act in the interests of the corporate strategy, shareholders, customers, employees and other stakeholders. Annual operational targets of a financial and non-financial nature are derived from the long-term and sustainable development of the company to ensure the implementation of the corporate strategy; the achievement of these targets is incentivized by means of the annual bonus as short-term variable remuneration. In addition, there is the long-term-oriented variable remuneration –

the PPSP – which puts emphasis on the long-term success of the company compared to competitors and the long-term performance of the Mercedes-Benz Group share price and thus also the sustainable return for the shareholders. Moreover, strategically-relevant and demanding, according to the opinion of the Supervisory Board, ESG targets are integrated into the PPSP.

Annual bonus


The annual bonus is a short-term variable remuneration component and is intended to incentivise for the contribution made in the financial year to the operational implementation of the corporate strategy, in particular the future-proof transformation through sustainable and technological realignment. With this in mind, the Supervisory Board derives ambitious

operational targets from the strategic business objectives for each upcoming financial year. In addition to financial performance criteria, these also include non-financial performance criteria and transformation targets.

Overview: Relation of the annual bonus to the business strategy

| Components of the annual bonus | Overview: Relation of the annual bonus to the business strategy |
|---|---|
| Financial performance criteria - EBIT | Strong operational focus on strengthening the global core business and providing the financial means to achieve the corporate strategy objectives. |
| Financial performance criteria - FCF IB | Alignment of remuneration with the extensive investment requirements arising from the Group transformation and incentivisation of further optimisation of cash flow management. |
| Non-financial performance criteria | Inclusion of important non-financial strategic targets and thus building blocks, such as strengthening the core business, adjusting the corporate culture, and strengthening the customer- and market-oriented structure. |
| Transformation targets | Clear focus of cluster/target criteria on sustainability and ESG aspects as part of the corporate strategy. |
| Consideration of competitors | Integration of a relative success measurement and creation of incentives for an outperformance of relative competitors. |

The target amount of the annual bonus, which is paid if target achievement is 100%, is currently set at 100% of the base salary. The total payout amount for the annual bonus is calculated as follows:



100% of the calculated annual bonus is paid out as a general rule in March of the following financial year.

Value at 100% target achievement (target annual bonus)

In the financial year 2024, it corresponds to the respective base salary.

Maximum annual bonus

The total payout amount for the annual bonus is limited to 2 times the base salary of the respective financial year.

Financial performance criteria

The structure of the financial performance criteria is to promote the long-term development of the company in terms of its financial ability to invest with its own funds in - for example - new technologies and business models. This is to effectively ensure the future viability of the company.

The financial performance criteria are based on the operating result of the Group (EBIT) and the free cash flow of the industrial business (FCF IB), both weighted at 50%. Besides revenue, EBIT and FCF IB are the key financial performance indicators for the Group’s operational financial performance.

Performance criteria in the financial year 2024:

- 50% comparison EBIT actual value 2024 to target value 2024;
- 50% comparison FCF IB actual value 2024 to target value 2024.

The measure of operating profit at the divisional level is EBIT. As earnings before interest and income taxes, EBIT reflects the divisions' responsibility for their earnings. The EBIT target value for each financial year is derived by the Supervisory Board based on the set medium-term return, which is ambitious and aligned with the competitive environment, and the growth targets. The starting point of the calculation is the revenue of the previous year.


In addition to the cash flows of the automotive divisions, FCF IB also includes cash flows from taxes and other reconciliation items not attributable to the divisions and is of particular importance for the financial strength of the Group. The target value for FCF IB in the respective financial year is based on the defined EBIT target of the divisions of the automotive business as well as on a strategic target for the cash conversion rate. The cash conversion rate is the proportion of the period's result that is scheduled to flow into the Group's liquidity after the payments for the necessary investments in research and development, tangible fixed assets and working capital are taken into account in accordance with the strategic growth target. When comparing the target 2024 FCF IB

to the actual one, adjustments are made for certain factors that were taken into account in the target achievement of the annual bonus in the financial year 2023 or earlier. Actual cash flows are adjusted for certain provisions that were already taken into account in the corporate bonus for 2019 and earlier.


The range of possible target achievement for the two financial targets EBIT and FCF IB is between 0% and 200%. The lower limit of this range represents 25% of the target value; the upper limit 125% of the target value. If the value actually achieved is at or below the lower limit of the range, the degree of target achievement is always 0%. The total absence of a bonus is therefore possible. The target amount is set as 150% target achievement and is aligned with management and employee remuneration systems. If the value actually achieved is at or above the upper limit of the range, the degree of target achievement is 200%, which is the maximum it can reach. Within the range, target achievement develops in a linear way.

For the financial year 2024, the Supervisory Board set the following financial targets, which were achieved as follows:

Financial targets in the annual bonus: EBIT (in billions of euros)



Financial targets in the annual bonus: FCF IB (in billions of euros)



Non-financial performance criteria

The Supervisory Board has defined non-financial performance criteria for the 2024 financial year from the four categories provided for in the compensation system: integrity and compliance, quality, employee engagement and customer surveys.

The non-financial performance criteria, which focus on sustainability and corporate cultural aspects, are assigned to four categories and, like the financial targets, apply uniformly to the entire Board of Management. These categories represent further building blocks of the corporate strategy and are thus

intended to promote the sustainable and long-term development of the company: for example, integrity and employee satisfaction as indispensable components of an agile, future-oriented corporate culture committed to social values, or quality and customer satisfaction as indispensable prerequisites for long-term and sustainable sales success.

For the 2024 financial year each category is weighted equally and receives an addition or a deduction of up to 2.5 percentage points each to or from the degree of achievement of the financial performance criteria. Across all four categories, the non-financial

performance criteria lead to an addition or deduction of up to 10 percentage points to the degree of target achievement for the financial performance criteria.

The addition or deduction is calculated based on measurable criteria, allowing target achievement to be clearly determined on the basis of a target/actual comparison at the end of the financial year. The total of the addition or deduction resulting from the non-financial targets is commercially rounded. For the 2024 financial year this results in an addition of 4.0 percentage points (rounded).

Overview: Relation of the annual bonus to the business strategy

| Non-financial performance criteria | Design | Target achievement 2024 |
|--|---|-------------------------|
| Integrity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Achievement of the Group-level targets regarding the further development and permanent establishment of the topic integrity was measured based on certain standardised questions in a global employee survey. - This measurement was based on the achieved approval rate of any questions, on the one hand, and the average approval rate achieved across all questions (integrity indicator), on the other. - Target achievement is derived at Group level at the end of the financial year. | 2.0 % |
| Customer target: quality | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Quality (quality KPIs of all divisions) were defined by the individual divisions for the financial year. - With regard to vehicles, a comparison was carried out of the target number and the actual number of claims during a predefined period of time, MiS (Months in Service). - The level of target achievement at the Group level is derived as weighted average of the individual divisional levels of target achievement at the end of the financial year. | -2.5 % |
| Customer target: customer satisfaction | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Customer satisfaction targets were measured using statistical measures such as Net Promoter Score and Customer Retention Rate. - The level of target achievement at the Group level is derived as a weighted average of the individual divisional levels of target achievement at the end of the financial year. | 2.0 % |
| Employee engagement | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employee engagement to the Group was calculated based on their answers to certain standardised questions in our global employee survey. - These answers, together with the participation rate achieved in the employee survey, are used to derive a level of target achievement at the Group level at the end of financial year for the maintenance and enhancement of a high level of satisfaction and motivation among the employees. | 2.5 % |

The following criteria are used for the evaluation:

| Integrity | | | |
|------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|
| Degree of target achievement | Addition/ deduction | Integrity + Indicator | Approval rate of any questions |
| Maximum | 2.5% | > 80% | > 74% |
| High | 2.0% | 71-80% | 65-74% |
| Low | 1.0% | 61-70% | 60-64% |
| Minimum | -2.5% | ≤ 60% | ≤ 59% |

| Customer targets/quality | | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|---|--|
| Degree of target achievement | Addition/ deduction | Quality KPIs across all divisions | |
| Maximum | 2.5% | The addition/deduction depends on the respective target value of the respective divisions or product. | |
| High | 2.0% | | |
| Low | 1.0% | | |
| Minimum | -2.5% | | |

| Customer targets/customer satisfaction | | | |
|---|---------------------|--|--|
| Degree of target achievement | Addition/ deduction | Customer satisfaction KPIs across all divisions | |
| Maximum | 2.5% | The addition/deduction depends on the respective target value of the respective division or product. | |
| High | 2.0% | | |
| Low | 1.0% | | |
| Minimum | -2.5% | | |

| Employee engagement | | | |
|------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Degree of target achievement | Addition/ deduction | Employee engagement + | Participation rate |
| Maximum | 2.5% | > 35% | > 70% |
| High | 2.0% | 31-35% | 66-70% |
| Low | 1.0% | 26-30% | 61-65% |
| Minimum | -2.5% | ≤ 25% | ≤ 60% |

Transformation targets

In order to take into account the implementation of the future-oriented measures for the technological and sustainable realignment of the Group, performance criteria and key performance indicators from the most important future-oriented fields were defined at the beginning of the financial year 2024. Here, as an integral component of the corporate strategy, sustainability/environmental, social and governance (ESG) aspects have an explicit significance for the business dealings of Mercedes-Benz Group AG.

The transformation targets represent both quantitative and qualitative aspects. They can add or deduct up to 25 percentage points to the degree to which the financial performance targets have been achieved.

For the financial year 2024, the Supervisory Board set transformation targets in the following topic areas of Environment / Social / Governance. Per the previous year, these include the following aspects:

- CO₂-emissions;
- Safety innovation;
- ESG stakeholder engagement.

The Supervisory Board has a common level of target achievement based on the degree of target achievement for the transformation goals and the strategic, organizational and structural contribution of the entire Executive Board, taking into account the economic environment and the competitive situation/positioning

for the Board of Management that takes into account the economic environment and the competitive situation and positioning of the Group. This leads to the addition of 10 percentage points to the degree of target achievement for the financial performance criteria for the financial year 2024.

The achievement was discussed and evaluated both in the Presidential Committee and in the Supervisory Board itself, taking into account the quantitative and qualitative aspects of this category, which led to the aforementioned addition.

For the volume markets of Europe, China and the USA, the CO₂ fleet emissions were calculated based on internal data and compared against internal and legal targets. The internal objectives were based on the planned sales and product mix for the 2024 reporting year. Due to changed market conditions and the corresponding effects on sales, the goals were not achieved in all three regions.

The safety innovations pursue the goal of our “Accident-Free Driving” vision. The main initiatives in 2024 included improving safety technology, achieving above-average results in relevant safety ratings and increasing safety awareness in public.


In terms of stakeholder engagement, Sustainability Dialogues at Headquarters and in relevant markets involving internal and external experts and stakeholders were included in the evaluation. Furthermore, the update to the Group Climate Policy

Report and the expanding of communication with regard to sustainability were considered.

Overall target achievement for the annual bonus 2024

The overall target achievement for the 2024 annual bonus is made up of the target achievements for the financial performance criteria, the non-financial performance criteria and the transformation targets, and amounts to 140% in the financial year 2024.

For the members of the Board of Management, this results in the following payout amount for the annual bonus 2024. 100% of this amount is to be paid out in March in the financial year 2025.



Total target achievement annual bonus 2024

| | Target amount | Financial performance criteria | Non-financial performance criteria | Transformation targets | Overall target achievement ¹ | Payout amount |
|-----------------------|---------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------|---|---------------|
| | in €k | Target achievement in % | Target achievement in % | Target achievement in % | in % | in €k |
| Ola Källenius | 1,876 | | | | | 2,626 |
| Dr. Jörg Burzer | 938 | | | | | 1,313 |
| Renata Jungo Brüngger | 938 | | | | | 1,313 |
| Sabine Kohleisen | 938 | | | | | 1,313 |
| Markus Schäfer | 938 | 126% | 4% | 10% | 140% | 1,313 |
| Britta Seeger | 938 | | | | | 1,313 |
| Hubertus Troska | 938 | | | | | 1,313 |
| Harald Wilhelm | 959 | | | | | 1,342 |

¹ Maximum target achievement 200%

Deferral 2022

Previously (up until financial year 2022), 50% of the annual bonus was paid out after the end of the financial year and 50% after the end of a further year (deferral), linked to relative share price performance. This was terminated at the end of the 2022 financial year.

In the financial year 2024, the deferral from the annual bonus 2022 was paid out. The relative share performance of the company compared to the STOXX Europe Auto Index for the 2022 deferral was 86% for the period from December 31, 2022, to December 31, 2023.

Performance Phantom Share Plan (PPSP)

The PPSP is a long-term variable remuneration component that is intended to put the focus on the long-term success of the company compared to its

competitors and the long-term performance of the Mercedes-Benz share, and thus also the sustainable return for shareholders.

The target achievement for the PPSP up to and including financial year 2022 was measured based on two performance criteria weighted at 50% each:

- First, the 'relative return in sales' in a three-year comparison with competitors is used as a performance criterion that is to set incentives to ensure sustainable and profitable growth and enhance efficiency.
- Second, the 'relative share performance' is used, which links the interests of the Board of Management and shareholders.

The relevance of the share price and thus the alignment of the interests of the Board of Management and shareholders is further strengthened by the calculation of the payout amount only after the fourth year of the plan term at the share price then applicable.

The target achievement for the PPSP from financial year 2023 onwards includes ESG performance criteria with a weighting of 20%.

Before the start of the plan period, the Supervisory Board sets measurable and quantifiable ESG goals. The goals are derived from the sustainable business strategy of the Mercedes-Benz Group and are relevant for its promotion and implementation.

Overview: Relation of the Performance Phantom Share Plan (PPSP) to the business strategy

| PPSP components | Relation to the business strategy/incentive effect |
|--|---|
| Relative return on sales | Integrates a main internal key performance measure of the Group and ensures sustainable and profitable growth. |
| Relative share performance | Links the interests of the Board of Management and shareholders. |
| Consideration of competitors | Integrates a relative measure of performance and thus creates incentive to outperform relevant competitors over the long run. |
| ESG targets (from Financial Year 2023 onwards) | Establishes the anchoring of sustainability goals into long-term variable remuneration. |
| Four-year duration | Ensures the sustainable and long-term growth of the Group. |
| Conversion into phantom shares | Strengthens the relation to the share price and thus the linking of interests of the Board of Management and shareholders. |

At the beginning of the plan, the Supervisory Board sets a grant value in euro for every financial year in the context of setting the individual annual total target remuneration. This amount is divided by the relevant "initial share price" of Mercedes-Benz shares, which results in the number of the preliminary allocated phantom shares. The initial share price is defined as the average price of Mercedes-Benz shares between January 1 and January 31 in the relevant year.

Also at the beginning of the plan, performance criteria are set for a period of three years (performance period). Depending on the achievement of these performance criteria with a possible range of 0% to 200%, the phantom shares allocated at the beginning of the plan are then converted into the final number of phantom shares allocated after three years.

After another year has elapsed (retention period), this final number of phantom shares is multiplied by the final share price of Mercedes-Benz shares (the final share price is calculated as average price of Mercedes-Benz shares between January 1 and January 31 in the

relevant year) to determine the payout amount. The share price relevant for the payout under this plan is also relevant for the allocation of the preliminary number of phantom shares for the newly issued plan in the respective financial year.

A dividend equivalent is applied for each phantom share held if a dividend is paid out for Mercedes-Benz shares in the respective year. The amount of the dividend equivalent is based on the dividend that is paid out during the respective year for an actual share in the company. During the performance period, it is granted for the preliminary number of phantom shares that have been allocated; in the year of the retention period, it is granted for the final number of phantom shares.

Value when granted


Determined by the Supervisory Board; for the financial year 2024 approximately 1.5 times the base salary.

Range of possible target achievement

0% to 200%, meaning that the plan is capped. It may also be zero.

Value of the phantom shares at payout

The value of the phantom shares to be paid out after the end of the plan period depends on the target achievement measured in accordance with the following performance criteria and the share price relevant for the payout. This share price is limited to 2.5 times the share price at the beginning of the plan. Furthermore, the final amount paid is limited to 2.5 times the value when granted at the beginning of the plan. This maximum amount also includes the dividend equivalent paid out during the four-year plan period. The total for the dividend equivalent is the addition of the dividend equivalent payments of EUR 5.30 per virtual share, paid out for the 2021 - 2024 plans in the 2024 financial year.



Performance criteria for the PPSP 2024

Relative return on sales (40%):

The achieved return on sales is determined in a three year comparison with the competitive group consisting of listed vehicle manufacturers with an automotive component of more than 70% by revenue and an investment-grade credit rating (BMW, GM, Honda, Hyundai, Kia, Porsche, Stellantis, Tesla, Toyota and VW). To measure the performance, the average return on sales of the competitors is calculated over three years. Target achievement occurs to the extent to

which Mercedes-Benz Group AG’s return on sales deviates by a maximum of +/-2 percentage points from 100% of the calculated average of the competitors.

- Maximum target achievement of 200% occurs if the return on sales of the Group exceeds 100% of the revenue-weighted average of the competitors by 2 percentage points or more.
- Target achievement of 0% for this performance criterion occurs in the event of a downward deviation of 2 percentage points or more. In the

deviation range of +/- 2 percentage points, target achievement develops in a linear way.

Relative share performance (40%):

Relative share performance is measured by the performance of the Mercedes-Benz share in a three-year comparison with the performance of the defined group of competitors. If the performance of the Mercedes-Benz share price (in %) is the same as that of the group of competitors (in %), target achievement is deemed to be 100%. If the performance of the share

price (in %) is 50 percentage points or more above (below) the performance of the group of competitors, target achievement is deemed to be 200% (0%). In the deviation range of +/- 50 percentage points, target achievement develops in a linear way.

ESG targets (20%):

Based on the target ranges defined by the Supervisory Board, a target achievement of 0% to 200% is possible for each ESG goal. For each ESG goal, the Supervisory Board sets a value for the 3-year performance period that corresponds to 100% target achievement, as well as a value that corresponds to 0% target achievement and a value that corresponds to 200% target achievement. To determine the target achievement per ESG goal after the 3-year performance period, the actual value achieved per ESG goal is compared to the values set per ESG goal. Subsequently, the target achievement for ESG goals is calculated based on the target achievement per ESG goal multiplied by its respective weighting. The results are then added up to determine the target achievement of the ESG goals.


For the PPSP tranche 2024, which was allocated at the beginning of the 2024 financial year and whose plan period ends at the end of the 2027 financial year, the Supervisory Board determined ESG goals from the categories "Sustainable Urban Mobility & Electromobility," "Respect for Human Rights" or "Sustainable Supply Chains," and "Diversity & Equal Opportunities", per the previous year:

| ESG targets PPSP tranche 2024 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--|---------------------------------|
| Category | Sustainable Urban Mobility & Electromobility | Respect for Human Rights / Sustainable Supply Chains | Diversity & Equal Opportunities |
| Target | Share of PHEV/BEV sales | Review of high-risk materials | Diversity |


Target achievement for the PPSP 2020

For the PPSP 2020, which was paid out in the financial year 2024 at the end of the four-year plan period, the following target achievement was calculated:

Financial targets for PPSP: relative return on sales



Financial targets for PPSP: relative share performance




The spin-off of the commercial vehicle business, which was completed at the end of the financial year 2021, had an impact on the PPSP 2020. The payout of the PPSP 2020 was based on a combined closing price of the Daimler-/Mercedes-Benz Group share and the Daimler Truck share. The PPSPs 2019 to 2021 continued as Group-specific plans following the successful spin-off of the commercial vehicle business. On the basis of the allocation ratio of 1:2 defined for the shareholders and the share prices of Daimler AG and Daimler Truck Holding AG in the period from December 10 to December 31, 2021, a conversion factor of 1.2199 was determined for the phantom shares of Mercedes-Benz Group AG. This was applied to the previous number of phantom shares in order to continue the PPSP at the same value.

In 2020, the maximum target achievement of 200% for the performance criteria of relative revenue return and relative stock performance was reached by the PPSP.

The limit for the payout-relevant stock price, which was set at 2.5 times the stock price at the start of the plan, was not achieved. However, the cap for the final payout amount (including the dividend equivalents paid out

during the four-year plan period) at 2.5 times the allocation value at the start of the plan (payout factor) was reached for the PPSP 2020. Therefore, a cap was applied.

The following figure shows the target achievements, the share price performance and the payout factor of the PPSP 2020 in total:



The following table shows the grant value per Board of Management member and the payout amount of the PPSP 2020 resulting from overall target achievement and share performance:

Total target achievement PPSP 2020

| | Value when granted | Share price when granted | Preliminary number of phantom shares ² | Overall target achievement | Final number of phantom shares | Share price at payout | Payout amount ³ |
|-------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|---|----------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| | in €k | in € | | in % | | in € | in €k |
| Ola Källenius | 2,200 | | 58,192 | | 116,384 | | 4,497 |
| Dr. Jörg Burzer ¹ | 500 | | 13,227 | | 26,454 | | 1,628 |
| Renata Jungo Brüngger | 1,100 | | 29,096 | | 58,192 | | 2,248 |
| Sabine Kohleisen ¹ | 300 | | 7,936 | | 15,872 | | 977 |
| Markus Schäfer | 1,100 | 46.12 | 29,096 | 200% | 58,192 | 61.53 | 2,248 |
| Britta Seeger | 1,100 | | 29,096 | | 58,192 | | 2,248 |
| Hubertus Troska | 1,100 | | 29,096 | | 58,192 | | 2,248 |
| Harald Wilhelm | 1,100 | | 29,096 | | 58,192 | | 2,248 |

¹ Allocation as a manager below the Board of Management. Plans for the level below the Board of Management differ in terms of target achievement and in the cap. Plans assigned to the Board of Management have an increased level of target aspiration.

² A conversion factor of 1.2199 was used for PPSP 2019-2021 to determine the adjusted number of preliminary phantom shares after the spin-off of the Truck division.

³ The payout amount is limited to 2.5 times the allocation value, including dividend equivalent payments.

Guidelines for share ownership

As a supplement to the remuneration components of the Board of Management, stock ownership guidelines exist for the Board of Management (Stock Ownership Guidelines). These guidelines require members of the Board of Management to invest in Mercedes-Benz Group shares over a period of several years and to hold those shares until two years after the end of their employment have passed. Depending on the functional responsibility of the respective Board of Management member, the number of shares to be held is between 20,000 and 75,000. In fulfilment of the policies, up to 25% of the gross remuneration out of each Performance Phantom Share Plan is generally to be used to purchase shares in the company, but the required shares can also be purchased in other ways.

As at December 31, 2024, the following status for the Stock Ownership Guidelines and their implementation resulted for the members of the Board of Management:

Stock Ownership Guidelines

| | SOG target | | Status quo |
|-----------------------|------------|--------|------------------------|
| | Number | Number | in % of the SOG target |
| Ola Källenius | 75,000 | 47,179 | 63 % |
| Dr Jörg Burzer | 20,000 | 10,095 | 50 % |
| Renata Jungo Brüngger | 20,000 | 20,000 | 100 % |
| Sabine Kohleisen | 20,000 | 6,402 | 32 % |
| Markus Schäfer | 20,000 | 20,000 | 100 % |
| Britta Seeger | 20,000 | 20,000 | 100 % |
| Hubertus Troska | 20,000 | 20,000 | 100 % |
| Harald Wilhelm | 25,000 | 13,857 | 55 % |

Malus/Clawback

Malus and clawback provisions are implemented in the service contracts and the PPSP plan conditions.

These provisions allow for the partial or complete reduction of the annual bonus for any Board of Management member who violates the duties pursuant to Section 93 AktG and, in particular, the principles laid down in the company's Integrity Code. If it is not possible to reduce a future bonus payment or a payment that has yet to be made, the Board of Management member in question will be required to pay back the amount of the bonus reduction from already paid bonuses. The Supervisory Board decides on such bonus reductions.

The terms governing the PPSP include a provision that allows for the partial or complete reduction of the payout for any member of the Board of Management who clearly violates the principles laid down in the company's Integrity Code or any other professional obligations prior to the payout of the plan proceeds. The Supervisory Board decides on such bonus reductions.

There were no reasons for applying the malus or clawback provisions in the financial year 2024, which is why there were no reductions or repayments.

Early termination of service

The durations of the service contracts of the members of the Board of Management correspond to their terms of appointment.

If the appointment of a member of the Board of Management is revoked pursuant to Section 84 Sub-section 4 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) and there is good cause as defined in Section 626 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB), the service contract shall also end at the time the revocation of the appointment takes effect. In this case, no payments are made to the Board of Management member for the period from the effective date of the revocation.

In the case of early termination of the service contract without good cause within the meaning of Section 626 of the BGB, Board of Management service contracts include commitments to payment of the base salary and provision of a company car until the end of the original service period at a maximum. Such persons are only entitled to payment of the annual bonus pro rata for the period until the end of the membership in the Board of Management. Entitlement to payment of the performance-based components of remuneration with a long-term incentive effect (PPSP) that has already been allocated is determined by the conditions of the respective plans. In the event of retirement for age reasons, for example, or if mutually agreed, the plans are paid out in arrears. Already allocated plans are lost in the event of a unilateral resignation from the Board of Management position. To the extent that the

payments described above are subject to the provisions of the severance cap of the German Corporate Governance Code (DCGK), their total including fringe benefits is limited to twice the value of the annual remuneration and may not exceed the total remuneration for the remaining period of the service contract.

In the event of an early or regular termination of the service contract, both the short-term and the delayed medium-term component (deferral) of the annual bonus and the proceeds from the long-term PPSP are not paid out in advance but instead at the points in time agreed upon in the service contract or in the terms and conditions of the PPSP plan. The entitlements are inheritable.

A post-contractual non-competition clause is not included in the contracts of the Board of Management members. There are likewise no commitments in the event of early termination of Board of Management membership due to a change of control, nor are there any commitments regarding severance payments.

Information on benefits in the event of regular termination of employment can be found in the section 'Retirement benefits.'

Secondary activities of Board of Management members

The members of the Board of Management should accept management board or supervisory board positions and/or any other administrative or honorary functions outside the Group only to a limited extent.

Furthermore, they require the consent of the Supervisory Board before commencing any sideline activities. In the opinion of the Supervisory Board, this ensures that neither the time required nor the remuneration paid for such activities leads to any conflict with the members' duties to the Group. Insofar as such secondary activities are memberships of statutory supervisory boards or comparable boards of business enterprises, they are disclosed in the notes to the annual financial statements of Mercedes-Benz Group AG, which are published on the website. Up to a certain amount, the remuneration for mandates in listed companies in which Mercedes-Benz Group holds a direct or indirect interest is not offset. If the remuneration exceeds this set amount, it is partially offset against the Board of Management remuneration. When accepting mandates in companies in which Mercedes-Benz Group AG holds no direct or indirect interest, the remuneration for these mandates is not offset. In the financial year 2024, Renata Jungo Brüngger and Harald Wilhelm were members of the Supervisory Board of Daimler Truck Holding AG. The remuneration due by Daimler Truck Holding AG (payout in 2025) will be offset pro rata against the annual bonus for 2024 (payout also in 2025) in accordance with the applicable provisions. The approach is also described in the table 'Remuneration awarded and due.'

Remuneration from third parties

No remuneration was paid to members of the Board of Management by third parties with regard to their activities on the Board of Management in the financial year 2024.

Remuneration of the members of the Board of Management in office in the financial year 2024

The following tables show the remuneration awarded and due for each individual member of the Mercedes-Benz Group AG Board of Management in the financial year 2024 in accordance with Section 162 Subsection 1 Sentence 1 AktG, including the respective relative proportions of their components.

The disclosure corresponds to the disclosure already made in the past in accordance with the model table ('Benefits received') of the German Corporate Governance Code (DCGK) in its version of February 7, 2017, and thus ensures a consistently transparent and comparable presentation of the individual remuneration of the members of the Board of Management of Mercedes-Benz Group AG. For this purpose, clusters were defined for the respective remuneration components, based on the disclosure logic described as follows:

The one-year variable remuneration 2024 is disclosed in accordance with a vesting-oriented interpretation. This means that the one-year variable remuneration is disclosed for the financial year in which the performance measurement is completed and is therefore vested. The one-year variable remuneration is therefore disclosed for the financial year 2024, although the actual payout will not take place until the financial year 2025. For the deferral and the PPSP, on the other hand, a disclosure logic is chosen that corresponds to a payout-oriented interpretation. This ensures that all conditions subsequent or conditions precedent of the medium- and long-term oriented variable remuneration have lapsed or have been fulfilled and that the actual amount of the remuneration components can be disclosed in accordance with the actual payout.

The total remuneration awarded and due in the financial year 2024 is calculated as the total of¹:

- the 2024 base salary;
- the taxable non-cash benefits and other fringe benefits in the financial year 2024;
- the annual bonus 2024 determined for the financial year 2024 and paid in the financial year 2025 (one-year variable remuneration);
- the half share of the medium-term-oriented component of the annual bonus 2022 (deferral

2022) measured at the end of the financial year 2023 and paid in the financial year 2024;

- the value of the long-term share-based remuneration (PPSP 2020) paid in the financial year 2024;
- the dividend equivalents of the current PPSP (2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024) paid in the financial year 2024.

Furthermore, the pension expense in the financial year 2024 (service costs in the financial year 2024) is shown.

¹ In the remuneration component "annual bonus", the change in method in the remuneration system with regard to the abolition of the deferral in 2023 results in a disclosure-related special effect (the deferred annual bonus for the 2022 financial year was paid in 2024, as well as the full annual bonus for the 2023 financial year).

Remuneration awarded and due

| | Ola Källenius | | | | Dr. Jörg Burzer | | | |
|---|---------------|-------------|----------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|---|-------------|
| | | | Chair of the Board of Management | | | | Production, Quality and Supply Chain Management | |
| | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 |
| | in €k | in % | in €k | in % | in €k | in % | in €k | in % |
| Base salary | 1,876 | 16% | 1,770 | 14% | 938 | 17% | 885 | 21% |
| Taxable non-cash benefits and fringe benefits | 505 | 4% | 85 | 1% | 611 | 11% | 406 | 10% |
| Sum fixed remuneration | 2,381 | | 1,855 | | 1,549 | | 1,291 | |
| Short-term variable remuneration ¹ | | | | | | | | |
| One-year variable remuneration 2024 (100% of annual bonus 2024) | 2,626 | 22% | - | - | 1,313 | 23% | - | - |
| One-year variable remuneration 2023 (100% of annual bonus 2023) | - | - | 3,540 | 29% | - | - | 1,770 | 41% |
| Offsets from mandate remuneration | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Mid-term variable remuneration | | | | | | | | |
| Deferral 2022 (50% of annual bonus 2022) | 1,431 | 12% | - | - | 716 | 13% | - | - |
| Deferral 2021 (50% of annual bonus 2021) | - | - | 1,664 | 14% | - | - | 69 | 2% |
| Long-term variable remuneration ² | | | | | | | | |
| PPSP 2020 | 4,497 | 38% | - | - | 1,628 | 29% | - | - |
| PPSP 2019 | - | - | 3,965 | 32% | - | - | 788 | 18% |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2024 | 234 | 2% | - | - | 117 | 2% | - | - |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2023 | 214 | 2% | 210 | 2% | 107 | 2% | 105 | 2% |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2022 | 162 | 1% | 159 | 1% | 81 | 1% | 80 | 2% |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2021 | 373 | 3% | 239 | 2% | 85 | 2% | 54 | 1% |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2020 | - | - | 605 | 5% | - | - | 138 | 3% |
| Sum variable remuneration | 9,537 | | 10,382 | | 4,047 | | 3,004 | |
| Total remuneration in terms of Sect. 162 AktG | 11,918 | 100% | 12,237 | 100% | 5,596 | 100% | 4,295 | 100% |
| Pension expense (service cost) | 570 | - | 507 | - | 286 | - | 285 | - |
| Total remuneration (incl. service costs) | 12,488 | | 12,744 | | 5,882 | | 4,580 | |

1 100% of the annual bonus is paid out in March of the following financial year. The disclosure corresponds to the disclosure already made in the past in accordance with the model table ('Benefits received') of the German Corporate Governance Code (DCGK) in its version of February 7, 2017 and thus ensures a consistently transparent and comparable presentation of the individual remuneration of the members of the Board of Management. The one-year variable remuneration is therefore disclosed for the financial year 2024, although the actual payout will not take place until the financial year 2025. For the deferral (Mid-Term Incentive) and the PPSP (Long-Term Incentive), on the other hand, a disclosure logic is chosen that corresponds to a payout-oriented interpretation.

2 Dr Jörg Burzer: the PPSP grants for 2021 and earlier were awarded prior to his appointment to the Board of Management.

Remuneration awarded and due

| | Renata Jungo Brüngger Integrity, Governance & Sustainability | | | | Sabine Kohleisen Human Relations & Labour Director | | | |
|---|---|-------------|--------------|-------------|---|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| | 2024 | | 2023 | | 2024 | | 2023 | |
| | in €k | in % | in €k | in % | in €k | in % | in €k | in % |
| Base salary | 938 | 16% | 885 | 14% | 938 | 20% | 885 | 22% |
| Taxable non-cash benefits and fringe benefits | 70 | 1% | 82 | 1% | 304 | 7% | 590 | 14% |
| Sum fixed remuneration | 1,008 | | 967 | | 1,242 | | 1,475 | |
| Short-term variable remuneration ¹ | | | | | | | | |
| One-year variable remuneration 2024 (100% of annual bonus 2024) | 1,313 | 23% | - | - | 1,313 | 28% | - | - |
| One-year variable remuneration 2023 (100% of annual bonus 2023) | - | - | 1,770 | 27% | - | - | 1,770 | 44% |
| Offsets from mandate remuneration | -53 | -1% | -51 | -1% | - | - | - | - |
| Mid-term variable remuneration | | | | | | | | |
| Deferral 2022 (50% of annual bonus 2022) | 716 | 13% | - | - | 716 | 15% | - | - |
| Deferral 2021 (50% of annual bonus 2021) | - | - | 832 | 13% | - | - | 69 | 2% |
| Long-term variable remuneration ² | | | | | | | | |
| PPSP 2020 | 2,248 | 39% | - | - | 977 | 21% | - | - |
| PPSP 2019 | - | - | 2,377 | 37% | - | - | 425 | 10% |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2024 | 117 | 2% | - | - | 117 | 3% | - | - |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2023 | 107 | 2% | 105 | 1% | 107 | 2% | 105 | 3% |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2022 | 81 | 1% | 80 | 1% | 81 | 2% | 80 | 2% |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2021 | 187 | 3% | 120 | 2% | 68 | 1% | 44 | 1% |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2020 | - | - | 303 | 5% | - | - | 83 | 2% |
| Sum variable remuneration | 4,716 | | 5,536 | | 3,379 | | 2,576 | |
| Total remuneration in terms of Sect. 162 AktG | 5,724 | 100% | 6,503 | 100% | 4,621 | 100% | 4,051 | 100% |
| Pension expense (service cost) | 281 | | 250 | - | 281 | | 253 | - |
| Total remuneration (incl. service costs) | 6,005 | | 6,753 | | 4,902 | | 4,304 | |

1 100% of the annual bonus is paid out in March of the following financial year. The disclosure corresponds to the disclosure already made in the past in accordance with the model table ('Benefits received') of the German Corporate Governance Code (DCGK) in its version of February 7, 2017 and thus ensures a consistently transparent and comparable presentation of the individual remuneration of the members of the Board of Management. The one-year variable remuneration is therefore disclosed for the financial year 2024, although the actual payout will not take place until the financial year 2025. For the deferral (Mid-Term Incentive) and the PPSP (Long-Term Incentive), on the other hand, a disclosure logic is chosen that corresponds to a payout-oriented interpretation.

2 Sabine Kohleisen: the PPSP grants for 2021 and earlier were awarded prior to her appointment to the Board of Management.

Remuneration awarded and due

| | Markus Schäfer Chief Technology Officer, Development & Procurement | | | | Britta Seeger Marketing & Sales | | | |
|---|---|-------------|--------------|-------------|------------------------------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| | 2024 | | 2023 | | 2024 | | 2023 | |
| | in €k | in % | in €k | in % | in €k | in % | in €k | in % |
| Base salary | 938 | 16% | 885 | 14% | 938 | 16% | 885 | 13% |
| Taxable non-cash benefits and fringe benefits | 110 | 2% | 177 | 3% | 111 | 2% | 110 | 2% |
| Sum fixed remuneration | 1,048 | | 1,062 | | 1,049 | | 995 | |
| Short-term variable remuneration ¹ | | | | | | | | |
| One-year variable remuneration 2024 (100% of annual bonus 2024) | 1,313 | 23% | - | - | 1,313 | 23% | - | - |
| One-year variable remuneration 2023 (100% of annual bonus 2023) | - | - | 1,770 | 29% | - | - | 1,770 | 27% |
| Offsets from mandate remuneration | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Mid-term variable remuneration | | | | | | | | |
| Deferral 2022 (50% of annual bonus 2022) | 716 | 12% | - | - | 716 | 12% | - | - |
| Deferral 2021 (50% of annual bonus 2021) | - | - | 832 | 13% | - | - | 832 | 12% |
| Long-term variable remuneration | | | | | | | | |
| PPSP 2020 | 2,248 | 39% | - | - | 2,248 | 39% | - | - |
| PPSP 2019 | - | - | 1,901 | 31% | - | - | 2,377 | 36% |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2024 | 117 | 2% | - | - | 117 | 2% | - | - |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2023 | 107 | 2% | 105 | 2% | 107 | 2% | 105 | 2% |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2022 | 81 | 1% | 80 | 1% | 81 | 1% | 80 | 1% |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2021 | 187 | 3% | 120 | 2% | 187 | 3% | 120 | 2% |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2020 | - | - | 303 | 5% | - | - | 303 | 5% |
| Sum variable remuneration | 4,769 | | 5,111 | | 4,769 | | 5,587 | |
| Total remuneration in terms of Sect. 162 AktG | 5,817 | 100% | 6,173 | 100% | 5,818 | 100% | 6,582 | 100% |
| Pension expense (service cost) | 282 | | 250 | - | 286 | | 253 | - |
| Total remuneration (incl. service costs) | 6,099 | | 6,423 | | 6,104 | | 6,835 | |

¹ 100% of the annual bonus is paid out in March of the following financial year. The disclosure corresponds to the disclosure already made in the past in accordance with the model table ('Benefits received') of the German Corporate Governance Code (DCGK) in its version of February 7, 2017 and thus ensures a consistently transparent and comparable presentation of the individual remuneration of the members of the Board of Management. The one-year variable remuneration is therefore disclosed for the financial year 2024, although the actual payout will not take place until the financial year 2025. For the deferral (Mid-Term Incentive) and the PPSP (Long-Term Incentive), on the other hand, a disclosure logic is chosen that corresponds to a payout-oriented interpretation.

Remuneration awarded and due

| | | | Hubertus Troska | | | | Harald Wilhelm | |
|---|--------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|--|-------------|----------------|-------------|
| | | | Greater China | | Finance & Controlling / Mercedes-Benz Mobility | | | |
| | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 |
| | in €k | in % | in €k | in % | in €k | in % | in €k | in % |
| Base salary | 938 | 15% | 885 | 12% | 959 | 17% | 904 | 15% |
| Taxable non-cash benefits and fringe benefits ¹ | 532 | 9% | 687 | 10% | 47 | 1% | 63 | 1% |
| Sum fixed remuneration | 1,470 | | 1,572 | | 1,006 | | 967 | |
| Short-term variable remuneration ² | | | | | | | | |
| One-year variable remuneration 2024 (100% of annual bonus 2024) | 1,313 | 21% | - | - | 1,342 | 23% | - | - |
| One-year variable remuneration 2023 (100% of annual bonus 2023) | - | - | 1,770 | 25% | - | - | 1,808 | 30% |
| Offsets from mandate remuneration | - | - | - | - | -72 | -1% | -71 | -1% |
| Mid-term variable remuneration | | | | | | | | |
| Deferral 2022 (50% of annual bonus 2022) | 716 | 11% | - | - | 731 | 13% | - | - |
| Deferral 2021 (50% of annual bonus 2021) | - | - | 832 | 12% | - | - | 850 | 14% |
| Long-term variable remuneration | | | | | | | | |
| PPSP 2020 | 2,248 | 36% | - | - | 2,248 | 39% | - | - |
| PPSP 2019 | - | - | 2,377 | 33% | - | - | 1,782 | 30% |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2024 | 117 | 2% | - | - | 117 | 2% | - | - |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2023 | 107 | 2% | 105 | 1% | 107 | 2% | 105 | 2% |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2022 | 81 | 1% | 80 | 1% | 81 | 1% | 80 | 1% |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2021 | 187 | 3% | 120 | 2% | 187 | 3% | 120 | 2% |
| Dividend equivalent PPSP 2020 | - | - | 303 | 4% | - | - | 303 | 6% |
| Sum variable remuneration | 4,769 | | 5,587 | | 4,741 | | 4,977 | |
| Total remuneration in terms of Sect. 162 AktG | 6,239 | 100% | 7,159 | 100% | 5,747 | 100% | 5,944 | 100% |
| Pension expense (service cost) | 281 | | 250 | - | 292 | | 263 | - |
| Total remuneration (incl. service costs) | 6,520 | | 7,409 | | 6,039 | | 6,207 | |

1 Hubertus Troska: In connection with Hubertus Troska's activities abroad, there are still ongoing taxable non-cash benefits for previous years and location benefits.

2 100% of the annual bonus is paid out in March of the following financial year. The disclosure corresponds to the disclosure already made in the past in accordance with the model table ('Benefits received') of the German Corporate Governance Code (DCGK) in its version of February 7, 2017 and thus ensures a consistently transparent and comparable presentation of the individual remuneration of the members of the Board of Management. The one-year variable remuneration is therefore disclosed for the financial year 2024, although the actual payout will not take place until the financial year 2025. For the deferral (Mid-Term Incentive) and the PPSP (Long-Term Incentive), on the other hand, a disclosure logic is chosen that corresponds to a payout-oriented interpretation.

Remuneration of former Board of Management members in the financial year 2024

Dr Manfred Bischoff received pension payments in the amount of €875,731 in the financial year 2024. In addition, Dr Manfred Bischoff received fringe benefit payments in the amount of €23,050. The fixed remuneration components therefore account for 100% of the remuneration.

Wilfried Porth received the mid-term variable remuneration (deferral) from the pro-rata annual bonus 2022 in the amount of €238,569 for the partial financial year 2022 following his resignation (January 1, 2022 to April 30, 2022). In addition, he received payments from the PPSP 2020 in the amount of €2,350,444, dividend equivalents in the amount of €223,384 from the current PPSP (2021-2022) and pension payments in the amount of €155,748. In addition, Wilfried Porth received fringe benefit payments in the amount of €21,864. The fixed remuneration components accordingly account for 5% and the variable remuneration components for 95% of the remuneration.

Martin Daum received a payment of €1,118,733 from the company pension plan. Additionally, Martin Daum received fringe benefits amounting to €536. The fixed remuneration components account for 100% of the remuneration.

In financial year 2024, Bodo Uebber received pension payments in the amount of €337,329. In addition, he received fringe benefit payments in the amount of €22,503. The fixed remuneration components accordingly account for 100% of the remuneration.

Prof Dr Thomas Weber received pension payments in the amount of €408,001 in the financial year 2024. Furthermore, Prof Dr Thomas Weber received a payment in the amount of €519,171 from the company pension plans. In addition, he received fringe benefit payments in the amount of €11,602. The fixed remuneration components therefore account for 100% of the remuneration.

In the financial year 2024, Dr Dieter Zetsche received pension payments in the amount of €1,281,770. Furthermore, Dr Dieter Zetsche received a payment in the amount of €899,419 from the company pension plan. In addition, Dr Dieter Zetsche received fringe benefit payments in the amount of €30,481. The fixed remuneration components accordingly account for 100% of the remuneration.

The remuneration awarded and due in the financial year 2024 to the other former members of the Board of Management of Mercedes-Benz Group AG, who resigned more than 10 years ago, amounted to €12.2 million (financial year 2023: €11.3 million) in total.

Remuneration of the Supervisory Board

Principles of Supervisory Board remuneration

Pursuant to Section 113 Subsection 3 AktG, the Annual Shareholders' Meeting of Mercedes-Benz Group AG must resolve upon the remuneration of the members of the Supervisory Board at least every four years. The Supervisory Board new remuneration resolution was adopted by the 2023 Annual Shareholders' Meeting with an approval rate of 98.16%. Article 10 of the Articles of Incorporation of Mercedes-Benz Group AG was adjusted accordingly.

The remuneration of the Supervisory Board members is set, in the view of the company, in an appropriate relationship to their responsibilities and to the situation of the company and takes into account the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code (DCGK) as well as the

remuneration of the supervisory boards of other large, listed companies. An appropriate and relevant remuneration makes an important contribution to the competition for outstanding talent for composition of the Supervisory Board and as a result for the best possible supervision and advice of the Board of Management. This in turn is a precondition for the long-term success of the company.

The members of the Supervisory Board receive a function-related, fixed remuneration without variable components, to strengthen, in the opinion of the company, their independence in the performance of monitoring and advisory duties and in personnel and remuneration decisions. In addition, especially in economically strained situations in which variable remuneration components generally decrease, there is a need to more intensively monitor and advise the Board of Management, accompanied by an increased workload and increased liability risk for Supervisory Board members.

Furthermore, the members of the Supervisory Board are reimbursed for expenses incurred for Supervisory Board activities.

| Fixed remuneration | | |
|--------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Chairman | Deputy Chairman | Audit Committee Chairman |
| €600,000 | €475,000 | €450,000 |
| Ordinary member | Other committee member | Audit committee member |
| €200,000 | €300,000 | €400,000 |

Committee compensation

No additional remuneration is granted for chairing the committees of the Supervisory Board, with the exception of the Audit Committee, as this activity is generally included in the remuneration of the Chairman of the Supervisory Board, who also assumes these functions by law or in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Supervisory Board and its committees.

If a member of the Supervisory Board performs several higher-paid functions, the remuneration is based exclusively on the highest-paid function. Remuneration for committee activities for a financial year requires that the committee in question met at least twice in the financial year during this period in order to fulfil its tasks.

Additional benefits

No remuneration was paid in the financial year 2024 for services provided personally beyond the aforementioned board and committee activities, in particular for advisory or agency services, except for the remuneration paid to the members of the Supervisory Board representing the employees in accordance with their contracts of employment

The members of the Supervisory Board were also covered in the year under review by a financial loss and liability insurance policy for executive bodies and certain executives (Directors & Officers insurance) taken out by and in the interest of the company. The insurance premiums were paid by the company. This approach is in line with market practice and appropriate, in the view of the company.

Remuneration of Supervisory Board members in the financial year 2024

The individual remuneration awarded and due to Supervisory Board members, which consists of 100% fixed remuneration components, is shown in the table below as vested remuneration for 2024 because the underlying activities have been fully performed.

The total remuneration for the activities of the members of the Supervisory Board of Mercedes-Benz Group AG in the financial year 2024 amounted to €5.8 million (financial year 2023: €5.9 million).

Supervisory Board remuneration

| | Total remuneration | |
|--|--------------------|------|
| | 2024 | 2023 |
| in €k | | |
| Dr Bernd Pischetsrieder (Chair) (until 08.05.2024) | 211 | 600 |
| Dr Martin Bruder Müller (Chair since 08.05.2024) | 495 | 267 |
| Ergun Lümali (Deputy Chair) | 475 | 475 |
| Michael Bettag | 200 | 200 |
| Ben van Beurden | 300 | 300 |
| Nadine Boguslawski | 200 | 200 |
| Elizabeth Centoni | 200 | 300 |
| Dame Polly Courtice | 300 | 300 |
| Sebastian Fay (since 01.06.2024) | 231 | - |
| Marco Gobetti | 200 | 200 |
| Michael Häberle | 300 | 300 |
| Dr Doris Höpke (since 08.05.2024) | 195 | - |
| Timotheus Höttges | 400 | 400 |
| Olaf Koch | 450 | 450 |
| Gabriela Neher | 200 | 133 |
| Michael Peters | 200 | 133 |
| Stefan Pierer | 200 | 133 |
| Roman Romanowski (until 31.05.2024) | 166 | 367 |
| Pia Simon (since 01.06.2024) | 117 | - |
| Prof Dr Helene Svahn | 200 | 200 |
| Monika Tielsch | 200 | 200 |
| Dr. Frank Weber (until 31.05.2024) | 83 | 200 |
| Roman Zitzelsberger | 300 | 300 |

Note: The table represents the members of the supervisory board who were active in 2024.

Comparative presentation of remuneration and company performance

The following table provides an overview of the company's earnings performance, the development of average employee remuneration and the remuneration of the members of the Board of Management and Supervisory Board of the previous five financial years. The company's earnings performance is presented based on the financial indicators of net income of the company in accordance with HGB and EBIT and FCF IB of the Group. The average remuneration of employees takes into account the annual personnel expenses in relation to the number of employees (employees, apprentices and interns) on a full-time equivalent (FTE) basis at Mercedes-Benz Group AG, adjusted for certain special items and without Long Term Incentive. In addition, the remuneration awarded and due to current and former members of the Board of Management and Supervisory Board in the financial year and the previous year is shown in its development.

Comparative presentation

| | 2024 | 2023 | Change 2024/2023 | 2022 | Change 2023/2022 | 2021 | Change 2022/2021 | 2020 | Change 2021/2020 |
|--|--------|--------|---------------------|--------|---------------------|--------|---------------------|--------|---------------------|
| | in €k | in €k | in % | in €k | in % | in €k | in % | in €k | in % |
| Earnings performance | | | | | | | | | |
| Net income of the company (HGB) in € million | 8,572 | 12,098 | -29% | 8,877 | 36% | 9,538 | -7% | 2,133 | 347% |
| EBIT of the Group in € million ¹ | 13,599 | 19,660 | -31% | 20,458 | -4% | 29,069 | -30% | 6,603 | 340% |
| FCF IB of the Group in €million ¹ | 9,479 | 11,881 | -20% | 9,156 | 30% | 8,606 | 6% | 8,259 | 4% |
| Employees | | | | | | | | | |
| Relative change of remuneration of employees of Mercedes-Benz AG ² | - | - | -4% | - | 5% | - | 5% | - | 6% |
| Members of the Board of Management active in the financial year³ | | | | | | | | | |
| Ola Källenius | 11,918 | 12,237 | -3% | 6,581 | 86% | 4,284 | 54% | 3,623 | 18% |
| Dr Jörg Burzer ⁴ | 5,596 | 4,295 | 30% | 2,265 | 90% | 141 | 1506% | - | - |
| Renata Jungo Brüngger | 5,724 | 6,503 | -12% | 3,694 | 76% | 2,469 | 50% | 2,288 | 8% |
| Sabine Kohleisen ⁴ | 4,621 | 4,051 | 14% | 2,115 | 92% | 142 | 1389% | - | - |
| Markus Schäfer ⁵ | 5,817 | 6,173 | -6% | 3,285 | 88% | 2,100 | 56% | 1,649 | 27% |
| Britta Seeger ⁵ | 5,818 | 6,582 | -12% | 3,727 | 77% | 2,462 | 51% | 1,772 | 39% |
| Hubertus Troska | 6,239 | 7,159 | -13% | 4,214 | 70% | 3,103 | 35% | 2,940 | 6% |
| Harald Wilhelm | 5,747 | 5,944 | -3% | 2,923 | 103% | 1,928 | 52% | 1,465 | 32% |
| Frühere Vorstandsmitglieder | | | | | | | | | |
| Dr Manfred Bischoff (until 16.12.2003) | 899 | 880 | 2% | 787 | 12% | 814 | -3% | 828 | -2% |
| Wilfried Porth (until 30.11.2021) | 2,990 | 4,238 | -29% | 2,406 | 76% | 2,399 | 0% | 2,309 | 4% |
| Martin Daum (until 9.12.2021) | 1,119 | 763 | 47% | 690 | 11% | 2,328 | -70% | 1,967 | 18% |
| Bodo Uebber (until 22.05.2019) ⁶ | 360 | 3,189 | -89% | 2,652 | 20% | 1,087 | 144% | 9,834 | -89% |
| Prof Dr Thomas Weber (until 31.12.2016) | 939 | 903 | 4% | 835 | 8% | 798 | 5% | 763 | 5% |
| Dr Dieter Zetsche (until 22.05.2019) | 2,212 | 8,173 | -73% | 4,394 | 86% | 3,539 | 24% | 3,878 | 9% |
| Sum of other former members of the Board of Management (left more than 10 years ago) | 12,154 | 11,463 | 6% | 11,823 | -3% | 15,266 | -23% | 15,065 | 1% |

Comparative presentation

| | 2024 | 2023 | Change 2023/2024 | 2022 | Change 2023/2022 | 2021 | Change 2022/2021 | 2020 | Change 2021/2020 |
|--|-------|-------|---------------------|-------|---------------------|-------|---------------------|-------|---------------------|
| | in €k | in €k | in % | in €k | in % | in €k | in % | in €k | in % |
| Members of the Supervisory Board active in the financial year⁷ | | | | | | | | | |
| Dr Bernd Pischetsrieder (Chair) (until 08.05.2024) | 211 | 600 | -65% | 532 | 13% | 449 | 19% | 144 | 212% |
| Dr Martin Bruder Müller (Chair since 08.05.2024) | 495 | 267 | 85% | 151 | 77% | 116 | 29% | - | - |
| Ergun Lümali (Deputy Chair) | 475 | 475 | 0% | 429 | 11% | 255 | 68% | 197 | 29% |
| Michael Bettag | 200 | 200 | 0% | 152 | 32% | 154 | -1% | 132 | 16% |
| Ben van Beurden | 300 | 300 | 0% | 240 | 25% | 186 | 29% | 0 | - |
| Nadine Boguslawski | 200 | 200 | 0% | 151 | 33% | 63 | 138% | 0 | - |
| Elizabeth Centoni | 200 | 300 | -33% | 209 | 43% | 117 | 80% | 0 | - |
| Dame Polly Courtice | 300 | 300 | 0% | 143 | 110% | - | - | - | - |
| Sebastian Fay (since 01.06.2024) | 231 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Marco Gobetti | 200 | 200 | 0% | 102 | 96% | - | - | - | - |
| Michael Häberle | 300 | 300 | 0% | 213 | 41% | 216 | -2% | 158 | 37% |
| Dr Doris Höpke (since 08.05.2024) | 195 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Timotheus Höttges | 400 | 400 | 0% | 204 | 96% | 154 | 32% | 62 | 148% |
| Olaf Koch | 450 | 450 | 0% | 378 | 19% | 75 | 401% | - | - |
| Gabriela Neher | 200 | 133 | 50% | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Michael Peters | 200 | 133 | 50% | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Stefan Pierer | 200 | 133 | 50% | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Roman Romanowski (until 31.05.2024) | 166 | 367 | -55% | 193 | 90% | 49 | 290% | - | - |
| Pia Simon (since 01.06.2024) | 117 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Prof Dr Helene Svahn | 200 | 200 | 0% | 152 | 32% | 39 | 293% | - | - |
| Monika Tielsch | 200 | 200 | 0% | 152 | 32% | 9 | 1572% | - | - |
| Dr Frank Weber (until 31.05.2024) | 83 | 200 | -59% | 152 | 32% | 154 | -1% | 132 | 16% |
| Roman Zitzelsberger | 300 | 300 | 0% | 210 | 43% | 216 | -3% | 183 | 18% |

1 EBIT and FCF IB 2021: incl. discontinued operations. Note: EBIT and FCF IB may be standardised for the purpose of remuneration.

2 Remuneration of employees of the company: adjusted for special items.

3 2020: Taking into account the voluntary waiver of the Board of Management of 20% of the base salary for the period April 1 to December 31, 2020.

4 2021-2024: The payments from the long-term-oriented variable remuneration also include amounts issued before the the appointment as a member to the Board of Management

5 2020: The payments from the long-term-oriented variable remuneration also include amounts issued before the appointment as a member of the Board of Management.

6 2020: includes one-time payments from pension commitments. From January 1, 2019- May 5, 2019 payments out of active duty, from 23.5.2019 onwards payments out of pension agreements as well as ongoing payments.

7 2020: Taking into account the voluntary waiver of the Supervisory Board of 20% of the fixed remuneration for the period April 1 to December 31, 2020. Supervisory Board: in general not including remuneration of subsidiaries. 2020 und 2021: incl. remuneration of subsidiaries.

Note: In addition to his activities as member of the Board of Management, Dr Manfred Bischoff was also Chair of the Supervisory Board.

For the Board of Management



Ola Källenius

Chairman of the Board
of Management



Harald Wilhelm

Finance & Controlling /
Mercedes-Benz Mobility

For the Supervisory Board



Dr. Martin Bruder Müller

Chairman of the
Supervisory Board

Auditor's Report

To Mercedes-Benz Group AG, Stuttgart

We have audited the remuneration report of Mercedes-Benz Group AG, Stuttgart, for the financial year from January 1 to December 31, 2024 including the related disclosures, which was prepared to comply with § [Article] 162 AktG [Aktiengesetz: German Stock Corporation Act].

Responsibilities of the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board

The Board of Management and the Supervisory Board of Mercedes-Benz Group AG are responsible for the preparation of the remuneration report, including the related disclosures, that complies with the requirements of § 162 AktG. The Board of Management and the Supervisory Board are also responsible for such internal control as they determine is necessary to enable the preparation of a remuneration report, including the related disclosures, that is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.

Auditor's Responsibilities

Our responsibility is to express an opinion on this remuneration report, including the related disclosures, based on our audit. We conducted our audit in accordance with German generally accepted standards for the audit of financial statements promulgated by the Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer (Institute of Public Auditors in Germany) (IDW). Those standards require

that we comply with ethical requirements and plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the remuneration report, including the related disclosures, is free from material misstatement.

An audit involves performing procedures to obtain audit evidence about the amounts including the related disclosures stated in the remuneration report. The procedures selected depend on the auditor's judgment. This includes the assessment of the risks of material misstatement of the remuneration report including the related disclosures, whether due to fraud or error.

In making those risk assessments, the auditor considers internal control relevant to the preparation of the remuneration report including the related disclosures. The objective of this is to plan and perform audit procedures that are appropriate in the circumstances, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the company's internal control. An audit also includes evaluating the appropriateness of accounting policies used and the reasonableness of accounting estimates made by the executive directors and the supervisory board, as well as evaluating the overall presentation of the remuneration report including the related disclosures.

We believe that the audit evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our audit opinion.

Audit Opinion

In our opinion, based on the findings of our audit, the remuneration report for the financial year from January 1 to December 31, 2024, including the related disclosures, complies in all material respects with the accounting provisions of § 162 AktG.

Reference to an Other Matter – Formal Audit of the Remuneration Report according to § 162 AktG

The audit of the content of the remuneration report described in this auditor's report includes the formal audit of the remuneration report required by § 162 Abs. [paragraph] 3 AktG, including the issuance of a report on this audit. As we express an unqualified audit opinion on the content of the remuneration report, this audit opinion includes that the information required by § 162 Abs. 1 and 2 AktG has been disclosed in all material respects in the remuneration report.

Restriction on use

We issue this auditor's report on the basis of the engagement agreed with Mercedes-Benz Group AG. The audit has been performed only for purposes of the company and the auditor's report is solely intended to inform the company as to the results of the audit. Our responsibility for the audit and for our auditor's report is only towards the company in accordance with this engagement. The auditor's report is not intended for any third parties to base any (financial) decisions thereon. We do not assume any responsibility, duty of care or liability towards third parties; no third parties are included in the scope of protection of the underlying engagement.

§ 334 BGB [Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch: German Civil Code], according to which objections arising from a contract may also be raised against third parties, is not waived.

Stuttgart, March 11, 2025

PricewaterhouseCoopers GmbH
Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft

Dietmar Prümm
Wirtschaftsprüfer
[German Public Auditor]

Thomas Tandetzki
Wirtschaftsprüfer
[German Public Auditor]

